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T his article examines the choice of pricing policy (posted pricing or negotiation) toward end customers in a supplychain. Many retailers actively decide whether or not to encourage negotiation on the shop floor. Of course, the retail-
er’s pricing policy influences not only the retailer’s profit, but also the profits of the manufacturers who sell through the
retailer. However, little is known about the forces that shape the pricing policy when two self-interested parties interact
in a supply chain. We consider two alternative models depending on who has the power to decide the pricing policy: the
manufacturer or the retailer. We find that an increase in the wholesale price weakens the retailer’s ability to price discrim-
inate through negotiation. Therefore, the retailer prefers negotiation at lower wholesale prices and posted pricing at
higher wholesale prices. We also find that whenever the retailer prefers negotiation, the manufacturer does too. Therefore,
the retailer’s discretion over the pricing policy causes friction only when the retailer wants to use posted pricing, while
the manufacturer wishes the retailer to use negotiation. We show that such friction arises only when product availability
or the cost of negotiation is moderate. In this case, we show that the manufacturer may offer a substantial discount to per-
suade the retailer to negotiate. Surprisingly, in this region of friction, a decrease in the supply chain’s capacity or an
increase in negotiation costs (both of which are typically considered as worsening the retailer’s business environment)
translates into higher profit for the retailer.
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1. Introduction
When it comes to deciding whether or not to allow
negotiation on the shop floor, retailers do not necessar-
ily default to the more commonly adopted format in
their category. For example, in the automotive indus-
try, where haggling is more or less the norm, Fiat and
Scion dealers have nonetheless committed to selling at
posted prices. Similarly, Crystal-Pierz, a chain of deal-
ers selling power boats, advertises its “no haggle, no
hassle" policy as a distinguishing feature. Some jewel-
ers such as Tourneau (which operates both retail and
online stores) and an online jewelry store, Melrose
Jeweler (http://www.melrose.com), sell their luxury
watches (e.g., Rolex) at posted prices even though
negotiation is so common in jewelry that even some
online stores allow their salespeople to negotiate with
customers over the phone. Furthermore, these deci-
sions are hardly ever cast in stone, and retailers revise
their policies over time. For example, it was reported
that a Home Depot store adopted an “entrepreneurial
spirit" campaign, which empowered their salespeople
to make deals with haggle-prone customers (Richtel
2008). Similarly, customers have been able to negotiate
successfully at other primarily take-it-or-leave-it
pricing stores such as Best Buy, Polo Ralph Lauren,
and Nordstrom (Richtel 2008, Let’s make a deal 2009).
Conversely, Lithia Motors, the eighth-largest auto
dealer chain in the United States, selling vehicles from
all major manufacturers and brands (ranging from
Porsche to General Motors to Toyota), announced in
September 2007 that it would convert all of its 108
stores to haggle-free pricing within the next 3 years
(Welch 2007).
Of course, a retailer’s pricing policy for a product—
negotiation vs. posted pricing—influences the manu-
facturer’s bottom line as well. Therefore, it is not
surprising that manufacturers attempt to influence
the retailer’s pricing policy. For example, no-haggle
policies adopted by Scion and Fiat dealers have been
practically imposed by Toyota (the owner of the Scion
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brand) and Chrysler (the US partner of Fiat). In fact,
according to Laura Soave, the head of Fiat’s American
branch, dealers are asked not to offer deals below the
manufacturer-suggested sticker price to eliminate the
chance to haggle (LaBarre 2011). Likewise, it appears
that the boat dealer Crystal-Pierz’s no-haggle policy is
driven by the manufacturer of Tracker boats, who
insists that its products be sold at catalog prices.1
These examples establish that many retailers make
a non-trivial choice between negotiation and posted
pricing, and manufacturers have a stake in that
choice. Motivated by these observations, we analyze
which pricing policy emerges when there are two
self-interested parties in the supply chain—the retail-
er and the manufacturer. To that end, we use a
model that accommodates several features critical to
the retailer’s choice between negotiation and posted
pricing, for example, the price-discrimination oppor-
tunities afforded to the retailer by the use of negotia-
tion, the costs of negotiation incurred by the retailer
and consumers, the supply-chain capacity of the
product, and the manufacturer’s ability to set the
stage through its wholesale price. In the context of
this model, we answer the following questions. What
circumstances induce the retailer to favor posted
pricing over negotiation and vice versa? Which pric-
ing policy does the manufacturer prefer the retailer
to use? When are the manufacturer and the retailer
in conflict with regard to the choice of pricing policy?
When a conflict exists, can the manufacturer utilize
the terms of trade, for example, a simple and practi-
cal lever like the wholesale price, to induce the retail-
er to implement the manufacturer’s desired pricing
policy?
With regard to the retailer’s preference, we find that
an increase in wholesale price weakens the retailer’s
ability to price discriminate among customers
through negotiation. Therefore, everything else being
equal, negotiation dominates posted pricing at lower
wholesale prices, and the opposite is true at higher
wholesale prices. In addition, as intuition would sug-
gest, the retailer prefers negotiation when the supply-
chain capacity is sufficiently high (i.e., when there is
plenty of the product to go around) or the cost of
negotiation is sufficiently low.
As for the manufacturer, we find that whenever the
retailer gains more from using negotiation, the manu-
facturer also earns more from negotiation. Therefore,
when the manufacturer and the retailer are in conflict,
it is because the retailer wants to use posted pricing,
but the manufacturer prefers the retailer to use nego-
tiation. In this circumstance, the manufacturer will
have to choose between two alternatives: either
substantially discount the wholesale price so that the
retailer opts for negotiation (an outcome which we
refer to as reconciliatory negotiation) or force the
retailer to switch to posted pricing with a higher
wholesale price.
The cost of negotiation and supply-chain capacity
critically affect whether the retailer and the manufac-
turer will find themselves in conflict over pricing
policy applied to end consumers. Specifically, when
supply-chain capacity is high or the cost of negotia-
tion is low, both the manufacturer and the retailer
want negotiation to be the pricing policy toward end
customers. Hence, the supply chain settles into nego-
tiation. Likewise, when the supply-chain capacity is
low or the cost of negotiation is high, the supply chain
naturally settles into posted pricing. However, when
the supply-chain capacity or the cost of negotiation is
moderate, the incentives of the manufacturer and the
retailer are no longer aligned. This region is where the
reconciliatory negotiation arises and the manufac-
turer sacrifices some of its margin to ensure that the
retailer uses negotiation. It is in this region that coun-
terintuitive phenomena occur. For example, an
increase in negotiation costs or a decrease in capacity
could translate into higher profits for the retailer,
because the retailer’s discretion over the pricing pol-
icy forces the manufacturer to offer a substantially
lower wholesale price.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. We
position our article with respect to the earlier litera-
ture in section 2. In section 3, we describe the model
and present the preliminary results. Section 4 pro-
vides the analysis and results for the discretionary
retailer model, in which the retailer is the party that
chooses the pricing policy. For a brief comparison, in
section 5 we present the results for the manufacturer
leadership model, in which the manufacturer is able
to dictate the retailer’s pricing policy toward end con-
sumers. Section 6 concludes the article. All proofs
appear in the Online Appendix.
2. Literature Review
There are several articles that examine the trade-off
between posted pricing and negotiation from the per-
spective of a single retailer. Riley and Zeckhauser
(1983) show that when the seller incurs costs to bring
new customers, posted pricing is better than negotia-
tion. Wang (1995) and Arnold and Lippman (1998)
compare the profits of posted pricing and negotiation
when the retailer sells one object and find that bar-
gaining is always preferable to posted pricing if the
retailer’s cost of negotiation or the expected bargain-
ing power of buyers is sufficiently low. Roth et al.
(2006) find that the retailer is more likely to adopt
negotiation if the product is customizable. A number
of articles consider the same question—posted pricing
vs. negotiation—but in the presence of competing
retailers. Bester (1993) considers competing retailers,
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all of whom collectively use either posted pricing or
negotiation and characterizes the equilibrium under
each pricing policy. Adachi (1999) considers the pric-
ing policies of two competing retailers and finds that
both retailers will use the same pricing policy in equi-
librium. On the other hand, by allowing the market to
consist of both bargainers and non-bargainers, Desai
and Purohit (2004) show that both posted pricing and
negotiation can coexist in equilibrium. In addition,
they show that two types of prisoners’ dilemma can
occur: Even though both retailers would be better off
by committing to posted pricing, both may use nego-
tiation in equilibrium, and vice versa. In contrast to
previous work, our article examines the retailer’s
choice of pricing policy in a supply chain where the
self-interested manufacturer can influence the re-
tailer’s choice.
In our model, when the retailer adopts negotiation,
a customer will buy at a transaction price according to
the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution (GNBS),
which has been widely used in modeling the outcome
of negotiation between the retailer and customer. For
example, among the aforementioned articles that
study the choice between posted pricing and negotia-
tion, Arnold and Lippman (1998), Bester (1993), Desai
and Purohit (2004), Roth et al. (2006), andWang (1995)
all use GNBS to model the negotiation outcome. When
using negotiation, the retailer in our model must
choose a cutoff price below which the product will not
be sold. The transaction price is then determined by
the cutoff price, the individual customer’s valuation,
each party’s relative bargaining power, and the costs
of negotiation incurred by both parties.
Our work is also related to the stream of research
on trade promotions, that is, wholesale price dis-
counts that the manufacturer offers to induce the
retailer to lower its selling price. For example, Lal
et al. (1996) consider a model where two identical
manufacturers sell through a single retailer. Their cus-
tomer population consists of three customers: one
switcher and two loyals. In this model, trade promo-
tions exist because the manufacturers compete for the
switcher. Dreze and Bell (2003) consider a single-
retailer, single-manufacturer setting. They compare
the effects of two different contractual arrangements
for trade promotions: wholesale price discounts vs.
rebates paid to the retailer on units sold to the end
consumer. Both in our work and the work on trade
promotions, the manufacturer uses the wholesale
price as a lever to influence the retailer’s decision
making. However, in the trade promotion literature,
the retailer is assumed to use a posted pricing policy,
while in our work the wholesale price affects the retail-
er’s choice between posted pricing and negotiation.
There are several recent articles that analyze negoti-
ation in the context of supply-chain management.
These include Dukes and Gal-Or (2003), Gurnani and
Shi (2006), Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003), Lovejoy (2007),
Nagarajan and Bassok (2008), and Wu (2004). For a
review on cooperative bargaining in supply chains,
see Nagarajan and Sosic (2008). Most of this work
models negotiation between a supplier and a buyer
who then meet the end-customer demand by selling
at a posted price. In contrast, we examine the sales-
format choice of the retailer, who may use posted
pricing or negotiation when selling to the end custom-
ers, and we analyze how this choice can be influenced
by the manufacturer whose profit also depends on the
retailer’s pricing policy.
3. Model Description and Preliminaries
We consider a supply chain comprised of one manu-
facturer and one retailer where the manufacturer pro-
duces a product at a unit cost c and sells at a unit
wholesale price, w  c. After the manufacturer deter-
mines the wholesale price, the supply chain commits
to using one of two pricing policies toward end cus-
tomers: posted pricing or negotiation. Under posted
pricing, all customers who purchase will pay the
same take-it-or-leave-it price. On the other hand,
under negotiation, customers will pay individually
negotiated prices. We consider two alternative mod-
els: one in which the retailer has discretion over the
pricing policy and the other in which the manufac-
turer has the power to dictate the retailer’s pricing
policy.
After the pricing policy is determined, the retailer
purchases from the manufacturer. However, the
retailer’s purchase quantity cannot exceed Q, which
we refer to as the (supply-chain) capacity. The
capacity, Q, determines the product’s availability
and admits multiple interpretations. For example, it
could arise from the manufacturer’s production
capacity, or the retailer’s storage space or working
capital constraints, or a rationing policy imposed by
the manufacturer.
We consider an infinitesimally divisible consumer
population in which the consumers are heteroge-
neous in their valuation of the item. Let a be the size
of the consumer population and FðxÞ :¼ 1  FðxÞ
represent the fraction of the consumers that value the
product at x or more. Then, aFðxÞ can be interpreted
as the portion of the consumers with valuation x or
higher. We refer to F(x) as the valuation distribution
and denote its density by f(x). All of the results hold
under the following assumption on the valuation dis-
tribution, F().
ASSUMPTION 1. F() has an increasing failure rate (i.e.,
fðxÞ
FðxÞ is increasing in x), and its density f() is twice differ-
entiable and satisfies the following condition:
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f 0ðxÞð2f 0ðxÞFðxÞ þ f2ðxÞÞ  f 00ðxÞfðxÞFðxÞ 0: ð1Þ
As we discuss in more detail below, Assumption
1 allows a wide range of valuation distributions.
The assumption ensures that both the retailer’s
and manufacturer’s profit functions are well
behaved.2
Before we present our model where the choice of
pricing policy is endogenous, we first examine the
supply chain under posted pricing (in section 3.1) and
under negotiation (in section 3.2).
3.1. Supply Chain Under Posted Pricing
Suppose the retailer uses posted pricing and picks the
posted price p; then only customers with valuations p
or higher will buy the product. Thus, the aggregate
demand at price p is given by DðpÞ ¼ aFðpÞ. Assump-
tion 1 allows a wide range of valuation distributions
that induce many commonly used demand functions,
including linear, log-linear, and logit. Table 1 lists sev-
eral specific examples of the valuation distributions
and their corresponding demand functions, covered
by Assumption 1.
Given posted price p, wholesale price w, and
supply-chain capacity Q, the retailer’s and manufac-
turer’s profits are
PRPðp;w;QÞ ¼ ðp wÞminfDðpÞ;Qg
¼ ðp wÞminfaFðpÞ;Qg; and ð2Þ
PMPðw; p;QÞ ¼ ðw cÞminfDðpÞ;Qg
¼ ðw cÞminfaFðpÞ;Qg: ð3Þ
Define puðwÞ as the posted price that optimizes the
retailer’s profit when the supply-chain capacity is not
restricted, that is, puðwÞ ¼ arg maxpPRPðp;w;QÞ with
Q  a. For given capacity Q, let pðQÞ be the market-
clearing price at which demand equals capacity:
DðpðQÞÞ ¼ Q. Notice that pðQÞ does not exist when
capacity Q is sufficiently high.3 Note also that the
retailer will not set the price below pðQÞ. Had the
retailer set a price below pðQÞ, the retailer could
increase the per-unit profit margin without changing
the quantity sold. A standard argument shows that
the retailer chooses either puðwÞ or pðQÞ, whichever is
larger. Hence, given a wholesale price w and capacity
Q, the retailer’s optimal posted price, denoted by
pðw;QÞ, is maxfpuðwÞ; pðQÞg.
Define the market-clearing wholesale price, denoted by
wPðQÞ, as the wholesale price at which the retailer is
indifferent between puðwÞ and pðQÞ, that is4
puðwPðQÞÞ ¼ pðQÞ: ð4Þ
Notice the significance of wPðQÞ. For any
w  wPðQÞ, the retailer’s optimal posted price,
pðw;QÞ, is exactly the market-clearing price, pðQÞ (as
lowering the posted price any further will not increase
the sales quantity). On the other hand, if the wholesale
price w exceeds the market-clearing wholesale price,
wPðQÞ, then it is not optimal for the retailer to sell out
the capacity Q. In this case, the retailer’s optimal
posted price, pðw;QÞ, is puðwÞ, the optimal price in a
supply chain without a capacity constraint. In sum-
mary, wPðQÞ is the highest wholesale price at which
the retailer finds it optimal to clear the market. Thus,
given wholesale price w, the retailer’s induced profit
function, that is, the retailer’s profit function following
the best response pðw;QÞ ¼ maxfpuðwÞ; pðQÞg, is
Consider now the manufacturer’s wholesale price
decision: Anticipating the retailer’s response, the
manufacturer’s profit under posted pricing is
PMPðw; pðw;QÞ;QÞ
¼ ðw cÞQ for c  w  wPðQÞ,
aðw cÞFðpuðwÞÞ for wmaxfc; wPðQÞg.

ð6Þ
The manufacturer chooses the wholesale price w to
maximize PMPðw; pðw;QÞ;QÞ. To this end, let wuP
denote the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price in
a supply chain without capacity restrictions, that is,
wuP ¼ arg maxwPMPðw; pðw;QÞ;QÞ when Q  a.
Without a capacity constraint, Q, the manufacturer
will choose wuP. If the wholesale price w
u
P induces the
retailer to sell less than the capacity Q, then wuP must
Table 1 Examples of Valuation Distributions and Corresponding
Aggregate Demand Functions
Valuation distribution F(p) Aggregate demand D(p)
Uniform ½0; ab: F ðpÞ ¼ pba a  bp (linear demand)
Exponential (k): F ðpÞ ¼ 1  ekp aekp (log-linear demand)
Weibull (a,b): F ðpÞ ¼ 1  eðpbÞa aeðpbÞa
Difference of two Gumbel r.v.’s
(utilities of buying and not buying) with
scale parameter 1 and means a and 0:
F ðpÞ ¼ 11þeap
aeap
1þeap (logit demand)
PRPðpðw;QÞ;w;QÞ ¼ PRPðpðQÞ;w;QÞ ¼ ðpðQÞ  wÞQ for cw wPðQÞ;PRPðpuðwÞ;w;QÞ ¼ aðpuðwÞ  wÞFðpuðwÞÞ for wmaxfc; wPðQÞg.

ð5Þ
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be the optimal wholesale price for the manufacturer
(as if there is no constraint on capacity). On the other
hand, if the wholesale price wuP induces the retailer to
sell out Q units, then it is best for the manufacturer to
set the wholesale price to wPðQÞ as it is the largest
wholesale price that induces the retailer to sell out the
capacity. These observations are formalized in Pro-
position 1.
PROPOSITION 1. Consider the supply chain under posted
pricing. The manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price is
wPðQÞ ¼ maxfwPðQÞ;wuPg.
3.2. Supply Chain Under Negotiation
Suppose the retailer in the supply chain uses negotia-
tion. Our negotiation outcome follows GNBS, which
has been used to model the outcome of negotiation
between a customer and the retailer (e.g., Bester 1993,
Desai and Purohit 2004). Under GNBS, the total sur-
plus is split between the two parties and its allocation
to each depends on several factors: cost of negotiation,
relative bargaining power, and disagreement payoffs
(i.e., the payoff to each party when they fail to reach
an agreement).
Negotiation takes time and effort on the part of
both the retailer and the customer as each party learns
about the price at which the other party is willing to
buy or sell. For example, Welch (2007) reports that
negotiation increases the need for additional sales
managers at a car dealership, each of whom makes as
much as $150,000 per year in salary and compensa-
tion. The same article also reports that compared to
dealers using haggle-free pricing, dealers using nego-
tiation incur an additional $300 in per-car advertise-
ment costs. Customers also incur costs of negotiation.
On average, customers spend about 4.5 hours to close
a deal when purchasing a car (Welch 2007). The time
spent and effort exerted by the customer and the retail-
er are captured in the form of negotiation costs in our
model. Let cr and cb denote the cost of negotiation
incurred by the retailer and customer, respectively.
Allocation of the surplus to each party also depends
on their relative bargaining power. Following GNBS,
we model the relative bargaining power by parameter
b ∈ (0,1). Let b be the customer’s relative bargaining
power (thus, 1  b is the retailer’s bargaining power)
so that as b approaches 1, customers have all the bar-
gaining power. Here, we assume b to be the same
across all customers. If we assumed an individual
customer’s b to be drawn from a probability distribu-
tion (i.e., allowing consumers to have different bar-
gaining power), all our results would continue to
hold after replacing bwith its expected value.
An important construct in GNBS is each party’s
disagreement payoff as, at equilibrium, each party
receives a disagreement payoff plus a portion of the
remaining surplus according to their bargaining
power. The customer’s disagreement payoff is equal
to the individual’s utility of not purchasing, which is
normalized to zero in our model. As for the retailer,
let pmin be the disagreement payoff. Only customers
whose valuations are high enough to cover the retail-
er’s disagreement payoff will buy under GNBS, that
is, the customers with valuation r such that
r  cb  pmin. As the disagreement payoff increases,
the retailer will sell to fewer customers, but at higher
prices. In our model, we allow the retailer to choose
its disagreement payoff, pmin, which is equivalent to
choosing the range of customers to be served. Similar
assumptions have been made by Wang (1995) and
Arnold and Lippman (1998). A special case of our
model is pmin ¼ w þ cr, in which case the retailer
must sell to all customers who will pay at least the
retailer’s cost.
Once the retailer chooses its disagreement payoff,
pmin, GNBS stipulates that only the customers with
valuation pmin þ cb and above will buy the item. If the
final price is pN, a customer with valuation r will
obtain a surplus of r  pN  cb; the retailer’s (extra)
surplus beyond its disagreement payoff pmin is
pN  pmin. Following the GNBS (Muthoo 1999), a con-
sumer with valuation r  pmin þ cb and a retailer
with the cutoff price pmin  w þ cr will agree on a
transaction price pNðpmin; rÞ that maximizes the fol-
lowing objective function:
max
pN2½pmin;r
ðr pN  cbÞbðpN  pminÞ1b: ð7Þ
Note the significance of b, which represents the rel-
ative bargaining power of the consumer. If b
approaches 1, any consumer with valuation pmin þ cb
and above has all the bargaining power and extracts
the entire surplus by paying the final price
pNðpmin; rÞ ¼ pmin. On the other hand, if b approaches
0, the retailer extracts the entire surplus by charging
pNðpmin; rÞ ¼ r  cb to a consumer with valuation r.
For any b ∈ (0,1), the final price, pNðpmin; rÞ, splits the
surplus as follows:
pNðpmin;rÞ¼argmax
pN
ðrpNcbÞbðpNpminÞ1b
n o
¼ð1bÞðrcbÞþbpmin:
ð8Þ
Equation (8) can be rewritten as pNðpmin; rÞ ¼
pmin þ ð1  bÞðr  cb  pminÞ. The second term,
ð1  bÞðr  cb  pminÞ, represents the price premium
that a customer pays on top of the retailer’s disagree-
ment payoff and captures the price discrimination
benefits enabled by negotiation: The higher the
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customer’s valuation, r, the higher the price premium.
By choosing a higher pmin, the retailer can increase the
price paid by all customers who purchase, but the
price discrimination benefits and the sales volume
will decrease.
Given the retailer’s disagreement payoff pmin, the
lowest valuation among the customers who buy is
pmin þ cb, which we denote by qmin and refer to as the
cutoff valuation,
qmin :¼ pmin þ cb: ð9Þ
Thus, choosing pmin is equivalent to choosing qmin,
and (8) can be rewritten as a function of qmin:
pNðqmin  cb; rÞ ¼ ð1 bÞrþ bqmin  cb: ð10Þ
Given a cutoff valuation qmin, all customers with
valuation qmin and above buy, yielding a total demand
of aFðqminÞ. Notice that the seller will never choose
qmin below the market-clearing price pðQÞ. If qmin were
below pðQÞ, the retailer could always increase the
cutoff valuation slightly, which would increase the
transaction price pNðqmin  cb; rÞ without changing
the quantity sold, thereby improving the retailer’s
total profit. In addition, the retailer must choose the
disagreement payoff, pmin, so that it covers at least the
wholesale price plus the retailer’s cost of negotiation:
pmin  w þ cr. Consequently, the cutoff valuation
qmin must be at least as large as w þ cr þ cb.
For any qmin  max½w þ cr þ cb; pðQÞ, the retail-
er’s and manufacturer’s profits are given by5
PRNðqmin;w;QÞ
¼ a
Z1
qmin
½ðpNðqmin  cb; xÞ  w crÞfðxÞdx
¼ a
Z1
qmin
½ð1 bÞxþ bqmin  w cr  cbfðxÞdx; and
ð11Þ
PMNðw; qmin;QÞ ¼ ðw cÞaFðqminÞ: ð12Þ
Define quminðwÞ as the cutoff valuation that opti-
mizes the retailer’s profit when the supply-chain
capacity is not restricted, that is, quminðwÞ ¼
arg maxqminPRNðqmin;w;QÞ for Q  a. The retailer
sets the cutoff valuation equal to either quminðwÞ or
pðQÞ, whichever is larger. Hence, given a wholesale
price w and capacity Q, the retailer’s optimal cutoff
valuation, denoted by qminðw;QÞ, is maxfquminðwÞ;
pðQÞg. As in the case of posted pricing, define the mar-
ket-clearing wholesale price, denoted by wNðQÞ, as the
wholesale price at which the retailer is indifferent
between quminðwÞ and pðQÞ, that is
quminðwNðQÞÞ ¼ pðQÞ: ð13Þ
The interpretation of the wholesale price wNðQÞ is
similar to that of its posted-pricing counterpart
wPðQÞ: Under negotiation, wNðQÞ is the highest
wholesale price at which the retailer finds it optimal
to clear the market.6 Thus, given wholesale price w,
the retailer’s induced profit function, that is, the retail-
er’s profit function following the best response
qminðw;QÞ ¼ maxfquminðwÞ; pðQÞg, is
PRNðqminðw;QÞ;w;QÞ
¼ PRNðpðQÞ;w;QÞ for cw wNðQÞ,
PRNðquminðwÞ;w;QÞ for wmaxfc; wNðQÞg:

ð14Þ
Consequently, the manufacturer’s profit under
negotiation is
PMNðw; qminðw;QÞ;QÞ
¼ ðw cÞQ for cw wNðQÞ;ðw cÞaFðquminðwÞÞ for w  maxfc; wNðQÞg.

ð15Þ
Anticipating the retailer’s response, the manufac-
turer chooses the wholesale price w to maximize
PMNðw; qminðw;QÞ;QÞ. Let wuN denote the manufac-
turer’s optimal wholesale price in a supply chain
without any capacity restrictions, that is, wuN ¼
arg maxwPMNðw; qminðw;QÞ;QÞ for Q  a. Similar to
the case of posted pricing, the manufacturer chooses
either the market-clearing wholesale price or the
wholesale price that will be chosen in the absence of a
capacity constraint, as summarized in Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2. Consider the supply chain under negoti-
ation. The manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price is
wNðQÞ ¼ maxfwNðQÞ;wuNg.
The next proposition illuminates how the manufac-
turer’s wholesale price and the ensuing cutoff valua-
tion of the retailer depend on the costs of negotiation
borne by both parties. To that end, define
cT ¼ cr þ cb to be the total cost of negotiation.
PROPOSITION 3. Consider the supply chain under negoti-
ation. The manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price and
the retailer’s cutoff valuation depend only on the total
cost of negotiation, cT. That is, for all ðcr; cbÞ such that
cr þ cb ¼ cT for some constant cT  0, wNðQÞ and
qminðwNðQÞ;QÞ remain the same.
To see the intuition behind Proposition 3, consider
a negotiation between the retailer with the cutoff
valuation qmin and a customer with valuation r,
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resulting in a transaction price pNðqmin  cb; rÞ. The
retailer’s margin is the transaction price,
pNðqmin  cb; rÞ, minus the wholesale price, w, and the
retailer’s cost of negotiation, cr. In addition, notice
from Equation (10) that the transaction price,
pNðqmin; rÞ, is net of the customer’s cost of negotiation,
cb, which implies that the retailer absorbs the cus-
tomer’s cost of negotiation as well. Thus, the retailer’s
margin depends only on the total cost of negotiation,
not on how that cost is allocated between cb and cr.
REMARK 1. Our discussion so far assumes that the
customer’s negotiation cost does not depend on his/
her reservation price. However, one could envision
a situation where a customer with a higher valua-
tion incurs a higher negotiation cost. All of our anal-
yses and results go through even in this setting.
Suppose that the negotiation cost borne by the cus-
tomer with valuation r is cbðrÞ ¼ cb0 þ ar, 0 < a < 1.
Then, the GNBS (as defined in Equation (8)) now
becomes pNðpmin; rÞ ¼ ð1 bÞ½ð1 aÞr  cb0 þ bpmin.
After redefining qmin :¼ pmin þ cb0, all subsequent
results hold with cT now given by cr þ cb0.
REMARK 2. All our results and insights extend to
the case where negotiation attracts customers whose
valuation for the product is lower than the valuation
of those attracted by posted pricing. For example,
suppose that when negotiation is used, a customer’s
valuation for the product, r, is scaled down to gr,
where 0 < g < 1. All our results will hold after mod-
ifying the transaction price so that pNðpmin; rÞ ¼
ð1  bÞðgr  cbÞ þ bpmin.
REMARK 3. Our negotiation model does not explicitly
allow a list price from which the customers can nego-
tiate down. However, adding such a feature to our
model will not change the qualitative results and
derived insights. If there exists an exogenously set list
price, pe (capturing perhaps a quoted price from a
competing retailer or a MSRP), this price will impose
an upper bound on the final transaction price. In par-
ticular, the final transaction price for a customer with
valuation r will be minfpNðpmin; rÞ; peg. Notice that
for customers whose valuation is below pe bpmin1 b þ cb,
the transaction price will be pNðpmin; rÞ and these cus-
tomers will not be affected by the list price. On the
other hand, customers with valuations exceeding
pe bpmin
1 b þ cb will now pay pe. Thus, negotiation still
price discriminates based on customer valuation, but
the revenue from high-valuation customers is now
curbed by the list price, pe. The list price will reduce
the retailer’s benefit from the negotiation, but we
expect that our subsequent results will not change. In
fact, if the list price is chosen by the negotiating
retailer, the retailer will set the list price as high as
possible so that it does not bind the benefit from nego-
tiation, thus rendering the list price irrelevant. How-
ever, if one were to embellish our model so that the
size of the consumer population (denoted by a)
decreases in the announced list price, the retailer will
face a new trade-off: a high list price will be a less
oppressive bound for a final transaction price, but will
also reduce the size of the market that the retailer
serves. Such a role for the list price is beyond the scope
of this article.
3.3. Supply Chain with Endogenous Pricing Policy
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 examine the supply chain when
the pricing policy is fixed. Those preliminaries serve
as building blocks for the model where the chain’s
pricing policy is a strategic decision, which we
describe next. We consider two alternative models
depending on who chooses the pricing policy. In the
discretionary retailer model, the manufacturer sets the
wholesale price, followed by the retailer choosing the
pricing policy and the associated price (posted price
or cutoff valuation). In the manufacturer leadership
model, the manufacturer sets both the wholesale price
and the pricing policy. In response to the manufac-
turer’s decision, the retailer sets the associated price
(posted price or cutoff valuation).
3.3.1. Discretionary Retailer Model. Given the
manufacturer’s wholesale price, w, the retailer’s best
response consists of the pricing policy and associated
pricing decision: pðw;QÞ for posted pricing and
qminðw;QÞ for negotiation. Let IR be a binary variable
that represents the retailer’s decision on the pricing
policy: IR ¼ 1 if the retailer chooses posted pricing
and IR ¼ 0 if the retailer chooses negotiation. Then,
the retailer’s best response is either ðIR ¼ 1; pðw;QÞÞ
or ðIR ¼ 0; qminðw;QÞÞ. For a given wholesale price
w, the retailer solves the following problem:7
max
IR2f0;1g
½IRPRPðpðw;QÞ;w;QÞ
þ ð1 IRÞPRNðqminðw;QÞ;w;QÞ:
ð16Þ
The manufacturer chooses its wholesale price antic-
ipating the retailer’s best response. Let IRðw;QÞ
denote the retailer’s optimal pricing policy for given
w and Q. The manufacturer’s problem is then
max
w c
½IRðw;QÞPMPðw; pðw;QÞ;QÞ
þ ð1 IRðw;QÞÞPMNðw; qminðw;QÞ;QÞ:
ð17Þ
3.3.2. Manufacturer Leadership Model. Given
the wholesale price, w, and the pricing policy
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chosen by the manufacturer, the retailer responds by
choosing the price: pðw;QÞ if the manufacturer
chooses posted pricing and qminðw;QÞ if the manufac-
turer chooses negotiation. Let IM be a binary variable
that represents the manufacturer’s decision on the
pricing policy: IM ¼ 1 if the manufacturer chooses
posted pricing and IM ¼ 0 if the manufacturer
chooses negotiation. Then, the manufacturer’s prob-
lem is
max
w c; IM2f0;1g
½IMPMPðw; pðw;QÞ;QÞ
þ ð1 IMÞPMNðw; qminðw;QÞ;QÞ:
ð18Þ
We first present the results and discussion on the
discretionary retailer model, followed by the manu-
facturer leadership model.
4. Discretionary Retailer Model
We first characterize the retailer’s best response, rep-
resented by the pricing policy and the associated
price, as a function of the manufacturer’s wholesale
price w.
PROPOSITION 4 [RETAILER’S BEST RESPONSE]. There exists a
threshold wholesale price w^RðQÞ below which the retailer
prefers negotiation and above which the retailer prefers
posted pricing.8
Proposition 4 implies that once the retailer prefers
posted pricing at a given wholesale price, then it con-
tinues to prefer posted pricing at all higher wholesale
prices. To understand why, we first rewrite the retail-
er’s profit function when the retailer uses negotiation,
represented by Equation (11), with the optimal cutoff
valuation qminðw;QÞ:
PRNðqminðw;QÞ;w;QÞ
¼ a
Z1
q
min
ðw;QÞ
½qminðw;QÞ  w cT
þ ð1 bÞðx qminðw;QÞÞ fðxÞdx
¼ aFðqminðw;QÞÞðqminðw;QÞ  w cTÞ
þ að1 bÞ
Z1
q
min
ðw;QÞ
ðx qminðw;QÞÞfðxÞdx: ð19Þ
The first term in the equation above is equivalent to
the expected profit under posted pricing when the
posted price is qmin and the wholesale price is w þ cT,
leaving the retailer a unit margin of qmin  w  cT.
This term is always less than the profit that the retailer
could obtain if it used posted pricing at the wholesale
price w. Under negotiation, however, only the mar-
ginal customer (with valuation qmin) yields a margin
precisely equal to qmin  w  cT, and customers with
higher valuations yield higher margins. In fact, a
customer with valuation x [ qmin pays an additional
ð1  bÞðx  qminÞ on top of what the marginal
customer pays. This price premium collected under
negotiation is what the second term of Equation (19)
captures. If the price premium collected under negoti-
ation is sufficiently large, then the retailer would be
better off under negotiation. Now note that, as the
wholesale price w increases, the cutoff valuation qmin
increases as well.9 Hence, the price premium collected
by the retailer diminishes at higher wholesale prices.
This makes negotiation less attractive at higher
wholesale prices, as suggested by Proposition 4.
From Equation (19), we observe that the benefits
from negotiation depend on the valuation distribu-
tion, in particular, the dispersion of the distribution.
Observe that if all customers have the same willing-
ness to pay, negotiation offers no value to the retailer.
Hence, negotiation is more common in big-ticket
items such as vehicles and diamond rings not simply
because customers have high valuations for these
products, but because customers have high degree of
dispersion in their valuations.
Taking the retailer’s best response into account, we
now examine the manufacturer’s problem of choosing
the wholesale price. Proposition 5 examines the retail-
er’s and the manufacturer’s preferences toward the
pricing policy.
PROPOSITION 5. For any wholesale price at which the
retailer prefers negotiation (i.e., w  w^RðQÞ), the manu-
facturer also prefers negotiation.
One direct implication of Proposition 5 is that at the
threshold wholesale price, w^RðQÞ, which makes the
retailer indifferent, the manufacturer is better off if
the retailer uses negotiation. Hence, negotiation is the
Pareto-optimal pricing policy when the wholesale
price is w^RðQÞ. Therefore, applying the Pareto-domi-
nance criterion, the retailer chooses negotiation when-
ever w ¼ w^RðQÞ. Such tie-breaking behavior on the
part of the retailer can be easily enforced by choosing
the wholesale price w^R   for arbitrarily small  > 0
so that the retailer strictly prefers negotiation over
posted pricing.
Recall that the manufacturer’s profit is the margin
(w  c) times the sales quantity. Hence, Proposition 5
implies that, at the wholesale price where the retailer
is indifferent between the two pricing policies, the
manufacturer wishes the retailer to use negotiation, as
it leads to a larger sales quantity. When the wholesale
price is slightly above w^RðQÞ, the manufacturer will
continue to prefer that the retailer negotiate, but the
retailer now prefers to use posted pricing. This
implies that there is a range of wholesale prices above
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w^RðQÞ where the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s
preferences conflict. As we will see, this conflict of
interest will have a critical effect on the pricing policy
the supply chain eventually adopts.
Based on the structure of the best response estab-
lished in Propositions 4 and 5, the manufacturer’s
problem of selecting the wholesale price, stated in
Equation (17), can now be expressed as follows:
max max
cwbwRðQÞPMNðw; qminðw;QÞ;QÞ;
"
sup
w[bwRðQÞPMPðw; pðw;QÞ;QÞ
35: ð20Þ
With the retailer’s discretion in mind, the manufac-
turer determines a wholesale price to induce either
negotiation (i.e., w between c and w^RðQÞ) or posted
pricing (i.e., w greater than w^RðQÞ). Notice that the
manufacturer’s wholesale price is driven by the trade-
off between the unit profit margin, w  c, and the
sales volume: aFðpðw;QÞÞ under posted pricing or
aFðqminðw;QÞÞ under negotiation.
Because lower wholesale prices are needed to
induce negotiation, it becomes clear that the manufac-
turer will choose to induce negotiation by lowering
the wholesale price only if negotiation leads to a suffi-
ciently high sales volume compared to posted pricing.
Proposition 6 describes the candidates for the manu-
facturer’s optimal wholesale price and the resulting
equilibria.
PROPOSITION 6. The manufacturer’s optimal wholesale
price and the resultant equilibrium fall in one of the fol-
lowing three regimes:
(i) [Ordinary Negotiation] The manufacturer chooses
the wholesale price wNðQÞ and the retailer uses
negotiation with cutoff valuation qminðwNðQÞ;QÞ.
(ii) [Reconciliatory Negotiation] The manufacturer
chooses the wholesale price w^RðQÞ\wNðQÞ and
the retailer uses negotiation with cutoff valuation
qminðw^RðQÞ;QÞ.
(iii) [Posted Pricing] The manufacturer chooses the
wholesale price wPðQÞ and the retailer uses posted
pricing with price pðwPðQÞ;QÞ.
In the ordinary negotiation regime, the wholesale
price and the cutoff valuation are the same as those
that would arise if the supply chain’s pricing policy
toward consumers were exogenously restricted to
negotiation (analyzed in section 3.2). Likewise, in
the posted pricing regime, the wholesale price and
the posted price are the same as those when the
supply chain’s pricing policy toward consumers is
exogenously restricted to posted pricing (analyzed
in section 3.1). Proposition 6(ii), on the other hand,
shows that there is a different type of negotiation
equilibrium, which we refer to as reconciliatory nego-
tiation. This equilibrium is a consequence of the
retailer’s discretion over pricing policy. It arises
when the manufacturer prefers the retailer to nego-
tiate, but cannot induce the retailer to do so at the
wholesale price wNðQÞ, which is the wholesale price
the manufacturer would pick if it could mandate
that negotiation be used. Facing a discretionary
retailer, the manufacturer has to lower the whole-
sale price to w^RðQÞ to induce negotiation. In other
words, the manufacturer sacrifices some of the unit
profit margin in exchange for the higher sales vol-
ume enabled by negotiation.
Which of these regimes will arise in equilibrium
depends critically on the cost of negotiation. Proposi-
tion 7 characterizes how the equilibrium changes with
respect to the total cost of negotiation, cT, when keep-
ing everything else constant.
PROPOSITION 7. There exist two thresholds, cT and cT,
cT  cT, such that the equilibrium pricing policy is
ordinary negotiation for cT\ cT, reconciliatory negotia-
tion for cT 2 ½cT; cTÞ, and posted pricing for cT  cT.
The behavior described in Proposition 7 is illus-
trated in Figure 1. In this example, the supply-chain
capacity Q equals 500, so that capacity never binds
the sales quantity. When the total cost of negotia-
tion is sufficiently low (i.e., cT\ cT, with cT  1:3 in
Figure 1), negotiation is preferred by both the retai-
ler and the manufacturer. In such cases, the manu-
facturer can induce negotiation without sacrificing
its profit margin. In contrast, as cT increases, it
becomes more costly for the retailer to use negotia-
tion. However, as long as cT is only moderately
high, the manufacturer still prefers a negotiating
retailer because it leads to a high sales volume. This
is exactly what we observe in the middle region
(cT  cT\ cT, from approximately 1.3 to 1.575 in
Figure 1), where the manufacturer voluntarily
reduces the wholesale price to induce negotiation,
resulting in a reconciliatory negotiation equilibrium.
Finally, when cT becomes sufficiently large (i.e.,
cT  cT, beyond 1.575 in Figure 1), the manufacturer
no longer wishes to induce negotiation, either
because the increase in sales volume does not make
up for the necessary reduction in margin or because
negotiation simply leads to lower sales volume due
to the high negotiation costs. Of course, the specific
values of the thresholds, cT and cT, depend on the
valuation distribution of the product: The more dis-
persed the distribution, the more attractive negotia-
tion becomes. Hence, these threshold values would
increase.
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One implication of Proposition 7 is that the manu-
facturer may want to offer different wholesale prices
to different retailers depending on the negotiation
cost. The manufacturer can benefit from offering dis-
counted wholesale prices to retailers with moderate
negotiation costs, but not to those with high or low
negotiation cost. Thus, heterogeneity in the negotia-
tion costs of retailers may be yet another reason why
manufacturers want to price discriminate among
retailers.
Figure 1 demonstrates a surprising phenomenon:
Under the reconciliatory negotiation regime, the
retailer’s profit and sales volume increase in the total
cost of negotiation. In the regions where negotiation is
used, the wholesale price decreases as cT increases,
implying that the manufacturer is absorbing some of
the increased cost of negotiation. This reduction in
wholesale price becomes more pronounced in the rec-
onciliatory negotiation region. In fact, our analysis
shows that, in the reconciliatory negotiation regime, a
unit increase in the total cost of negotiation triggers a
wholesale price reduction of more than one unit (see
Lemma A.4(b) in Appendix A). In other words, the
manufacturer more than compensates the retailer for
the increase in the total negotiation cost, cT, so that
negotiation remains as the chain’s pricing policy
toward consumers. This generous reduction in whole-
sale price explains why the retailer’s profit and quan-
tity sold increase in cT under this regime.
Recall that the manufacturer’s preference between
negotiation and posted pricing is linked to the whole-
sale price and resultant sales volume. In particular,
because negotiation is induced only at lower whole-
sale prices, the manufacturer prefers that the retailer
use negotiation only when it leads to a significant
increase in sales volume. If there is a limit on the sup-
ply chain’s capacity (hence, the availability of the
product), it can reduce the attractiveness of negotia-
tion; thus posted pricing is more likely to emerge as
the pricing policy toward consumers. To illustrate
this, consider Figures 2 and 3, which illustrate the
same example shown in Figure 1, but with more
restrictive capacities, namely, Q = 406 for Figure 2
and Q = 350 for Figure 3. As Proposition 7 predicts,
even with tighter capacity, equilibrium still moves
from ordinary negotiation to reconciliatory negotia-
tion to posted pricing as the cost of negotiation
increases. Nonetheless, the tight capacity manifests
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itself in both figures. In Figure 2, the capacity binds
the equilibrium sales volume in two disjoint regions
(cT between both 0.5 to 0.72 and 1.31 to 1.42); in Figure
3, the capacity binds the sales volume at all levels of
negotiation cost. Comparing Figures 1, 2, and 3, we
notice that the range of negotiation cost in which
posted pricing is the supply chain’s pricing policy,
expands as the capacity Q becomes more restrictive:
cT above 1.575 in Figure 1, above 1.42 in Figure 2, and
above 1.215 in Figure 3.10 Proposition 8 formally char-
acterizes the evolution of the supply chain’s pricing
policy toward consumers as a function of its capacity,
keeping everything else constant.
PROPOSITION 8. There exist two thresholds, Q and Q,
0  Q  Q  1, such that the equilibrium pricing
policy is posted pricing for Q < Q, reconciliatory negoti-
ation for Q 2 ½Q; QÞ, and ordinary negotiation for
Q  Q.
To explain the behavior described in Proposition 8,
suppose that the equilibrium pricing policy is ordin-
ary negotiation. As this supply chain’s capacity
decreases, the retailer will focus increasingly on sell-
ing to customers with higher valuations, resulting in a
high cutoff valuation, which reduces the retailer’s
additional revenue enabled by price discrimination.
Hence, as capacity decreases, posted pricing will
become increasingly more attractive to the retailer.
Given this preference of the retailer, the manufacturer
will want to keep negotiation alive by offering a deep-
ly discounted wholesale price, as long as the sales
volume under negotiation is sufficiently higher than
that under posted pricing. However, once the capac-
ity becomes even tighter and more likely to bind the
sales quantity, the manufacturer’s benefit from nego-
tiation begins to lose steam. Hence, the manufacturer
charges a wholesale price that induces posted pricing.
The effect of supply-chain capacity may explain
why Lexus dealers are willing to negotiate the LS
series, but not willing to budge from the MSRP on the
comparably priced SC series. In 2008, Toyota sold
20,255 units of the LS series, but only 1986 units of the
SC series.11 To the extent that the sales volume is a
proxy for the supply-chain capacity, these numbers
indicate that the availability of the SC series is more
limited than that of the LS series. According to our
results, the limited availability could explain why
Lexus dealers hardly negotiate on the price of the SC
series. Prices of Toyota’s Prius around 2006 provide
further anecdotal evidence. According to a CNN.com
article,12 the availability of the Prius in the spring of
2006 was so tight that customers were paying more
than MSRP for used Priuses with low mileage. Toy-
ota’s effort to increase production capacity, along with
a lower vehicle demand during the recent economic
crisis, made the Prius more available in 2009. Hence,
at the time of writing, the average transaction price of
a Prius is now well below the MSRP,13 which indicates
that dealers are now given more room to negotiate.
Conventional wisdom suggests that the retailer’s
equilibrium profit will decrease as the capacity
decreases. This is true whether the equilibrium pric-
ing policy is ordinary negotiation or posted pricing.
Surprisingly, this is not necessarily true under the
reconciliatory negotiation equilibrium. Observe from
the rightmost panel of Figure 4 that the retailer’s
profit increases as capacity decreases in the reconcilia-
tory negotiation regime. This is perplexing as, in this
example, the capacity is always exhausted in the equi-
librium so the sales quantity will decrease as capacity
decreases, but the retailer’s profit increases anyway.
This seemingly counterintuitive behavior can be
understood by recalling that the manufacturer offers
discounted wholesale prices in this regime. As capac-
ity gets tighter, the retailer becomes more reluctant to
use negotiation. The manufacturer counters by offer-
ing progressively lower wholesale prices, which is
why the retailer’s profit increases as capacity
decreases.
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The monotonic behavior of the equilibrium pricing
policy with respect to capacity Q and total cost of
negotiation cT gives rise to the following result, which
characterizes switching curves that separate different
types of equilibria. Figure 5 illustrates three equilib-
rium regimes separated by two switching curves,
which are formally stated in Proposition 9.
PROPOSITION 9. There exist two increasing switching
curves, QðcTÞ and QðcTÞ, QðcTÞ  QðcTÞ, such that the
equilibrium is posted pricing if Q\QðcTÞ, reconciliatory
negotiation if QðcTÞ  Q\ QðcTÞ, and ordinary negotia-
tion if Q  QðcTÞ.
We now examine the effect of disparity in bargain-
ing powers between the retailer and the customer.
Figure 6 shows how the equilibrium outcome changes
as the customer’s relative bargaining power, b,
increases. The behavior of equilibrium is similar to
the behavior with respect to the total cost of negotia-
tion, cT: As the customer’s bargaining power (b)
increases, the supply chain’s pricing policy toward
consumers changes from ordinary negotiation to
reconciliatory negotiation to posted pricing. At
sufficiently low values of b, the retailer is able to
extract much of the customer surplus, and the supply
chain settles in ordinary negotiation. As b increases,
the retailer’s ability to extract customer surplus is
hampered, making the retailer more reluctant to
negotiate. The manufacturer, on the other hand, is
willing to reduce the wholesale price to keep negotia-
tion alive, and the discount is especially sharp at
moderate values of b, resulting in reconciliatory nego-
tiation. Once the depth of the discount needed to
induce negotiation becomes too large, the manufac-
turer gives up on negotiation. The wholesale price
then increases and posted pricing becomes the retail-
er’s pricing policy toward consumers. Although we
observed this behavior in all of our numerical exam-
ples, the highly non-linear dependence of the transac-
tion price (and profit functions) on b makes an
analytical proof difficult.
The ease with which customers can find out the
invoice prices and MSRPs for vehicles is making them
more powerful bargainers. This may explain why
some dealers like Lithia Motors are turning to posted
pricing. It is rather ironic that as informed customers
are becoming more eager to negotiate, some dealers
shun away from negotiation, which was the gold
standard until recent years.
5. Manufacturer Leadership Model
In section 4, we studied a supply chain where the
retailer had discretion over pricing policy. We now
examine an alternative model in which the manufac-
turer dictates the supply chain’s pricing policy
toward consumers along with the wholesale price.
The retailer then determines the optimal price associ-
ated with the manufacturer-imposed pricing policy:
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pðw;QÞ under posted pricing and qminðw;QÞ under
negotiation. Examples of this type of relationship are
the “no-haggle” pricing policies imposed on Saturn
and Scion dealers by GM and Toyota. The manufac-
turer’s problem in this model, stated in Equation (18),
can be written as
max max
w c
PMNðw; qminðw;QÞ;QÞ;

max
w c
PMPðw; pðw;QÞ;QÞ

: ð21Þ
In this case, the choice of the wholesale price is
simple. If the manufacturer imposes posted pricing,
it will choose wPðQÞ, which maximizes its profit
under posted pricing. Likewise, the manufacturer
will choose wNðQÞ when negotiation is imposed.
The former leads to the ordinary negotiation regime
and the latter leads to the posted pricing regime. In
the manufacturer leadership model, the wholesale
price that leads to the reconciliatory negotiation
regime, w^RðQÞ, will never be deployed. Recall that
under the reconciliatory negotiation regime, the
manufacturer offers a discounted wholesale price
due to the retailer’s discretion. In the absence of
retailer’s discretion, the manufacturer need not
offer such a discount. Proposition 10 compares the
equilibrium pricing policy under two alternative
leadership models.
PROPOSITION 10. Given the cost of negotiation, cT, and
supply-chain capacity, Q:
(i) If posted pricing is the equilibrium in the manufac-
turer leadership model, it is also the equilibrium in
the discretionary retailer model.
(ii) If ordinary negotiation is the equilibrium in the
manufacturer leadership model, it is possible that
reconciliatory negotiation or posted pricing is the
equilibrium in the discretionary retailer model.
Proposition 10(i) shows that a manufacturer which
wishes to impose posted pricing can get its wish even
if the retailer has discretion over the pricing policy.
On the other hand, a manufacturer who wishes to
impose ordinary negotiation may end up with recon-
ciliatory negotiation or posted pricing when faced
with a discretionary retailer. As shown in Proposi-
tions 7 and 8, when the negotiation cost is low or the
capacity is high, even the discretionary retailer
chooses ordinary negotiation, and retailer discretion
causes no friction. However, as the negotiation cost
increases and/or the capacity of the supply chain
becomes tighter, the retailer’s discretion distorts the
equilibrium toward reconciliatory negotiation or
posted pricing regime. At such levels of negotiation
cost and capacity, the manufacturer who wishes to
impose ordinary negotiation has to settle for reconcil-
iatory negotiation or posted pricing in the presence of
a discretionary retailer.
Our results suggest that a manufacturer who
wishes to impose posted pricing need not implement
any monitoring practices beyond setting an appropri-
ate wholesale price. A practical implication is that
manufacturers such as GM and Toyota may not have
to exert extra effort to sustain the no-haggle policies
imposed on Saturn and Scion as long as the wholesale
price is set high enough to make the price premium
obtained through the negotiation relatively small.
6. Conclusion
This article studies the retailer’s pricing policy in a
supply chain—posted pricing or negotiation. We con-
sider two alternative models of leadership: Either the
retailer or the manufacturer determines the pricing
policy. Our analysis addresses a number of research
questions surrounding the pricing policy choice in a
supply chain.
First, we analyze how the manufacturer’s wholesale
price influences the retailer’s preference between
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posted pricing and negotiation. We find that an
increase in the wholesale price weakens the retailer’s
ability to price discriminate through negotiation.
Therefore, everything else being equal, negotiation
dominates posted pricing at lower wholesale prices,
and the opposite is true at higher wholesale prices.
This suggests that in the automotive industry, an
increase in the wholesale price of a given vehicle,
when keeping everything else constant, is likely to
popularize “haggle-free” prices.
Second, we analyze which pricing policy the manu-
facturer prefers the retailer to use. We find that when-
ever the manufacturer prefers posted pricing, the
retailer also prefers posted pricing. One implication is
that, in a supply-chain relationship like the one
between Toyota and Scion dealers, where Toyota
requires that dealers use posted pricing, the manufac-
turer need not engage in costly monitoring activities
to enforce posted pricing as long as the wholesale
price is high enough to make the negotiation benefit
small.
Third, we ask whether the manufacturer can
achieve its desired pricing policy simply by setting an
appropriate wholesale price. More precisely, does the
manufacturer give up any profits when the retailer
chooses the pricing policy? Our answer is yes, but
only when the manufacturer prefers negotiation but
the retailer does not. In this case, when the manufac-
turer cannot mandate the retailer’s pricing policy
toward consumers, the manufacturer either induces
the retailer to use negotiation by offering a substan-
tially discounted wholesale price (reconciliatory negoti-
ation) or gives up negotiation and charges a high
wholesale price to induce posted pricing. These are
the only instances that the manufacturer suffers a loss
when it does not have power over pricing policy. For
all other cases, the supply-chain profit and its alloca-
tions do not depend on who determines the pricing
policy. Specifically, when the cost of negotiation is
low or the supply-chain capacity is large (both of
which enhance the benefit from price discrimination),
the manufacturer’s and retailer’s interests are aligned
to use negotiation. Likewise, when the cost of negotia-
tion is high or the capacity is low, both parties’ inter-
ests are aligned to use posted pricing. For a given
product, the capacity and the associated negotiation
cost play an important role in determining the chain’s
pricing policy toward consumers. In light of this, our
results support Best Buy’s and Home Depot’s strategy
that allows salespeople to negotiate the prices of select
products. On a related note, based on our findings, it
is questionable whether Lithia Motors (who sells mul-
tiple brands of vehicles ranging from KIA to Porsche)
made the right move by switching all of its 108 stores
to haggle-free pricing. The rationale for Lithia’s deci-
sion must go beyond the scope of our model such as
competitive pressure (AutoNation advertising its hag-
gle-free prices) and reputation.
Lastly, we analyze how the cost of negotiation and
the supply-chain capacity influence the type of equi-
librium. In particular, what are the settings for negoti-
ation cost and capacity that will lead to reconciliatory
negotiation as an equilibrium outcome? We find that
reconciliatory negotiation arises when the capacity or
the cost of negotiation is moderate. Thus, only when
the capacity or the cost of negotiation is moderate
does the the manufacturer suffer a loss for not being
able to mandate the retailer’s pricing policy toward
consumers. Surprisingly, in this region, an increase in
negotiation costs or a decrease in capacity could trans-
late to higher profits for the retailer who has power to
decide the pricing policy. This counterintuitive phe-
nomenon arises because the retailer’s discretion over
the pricing policy forces the manufacturer to lower
the wholesale price so much that the retailer’s profit
margin (net of negotiation costs) increases.
We assumed in our analysis that the size of poten-
tial consumer population, denoted by a, does not
depend on the choice of the pricing policy at the
retailer level. One could speculate that the size of the
population will be smaller under negotiation, maybe
because customers who dislike hassles of negotiation
will switch to other sellers. Some of this effect is
already captured in our model through the cost of
negotiation incurred by the customer. In any event,
the size of the population simply scales the profit
functions without changing their fundamental prop-
erties. Therefore, regardless of whether the consumer
population is larger or smaller under negotiation, the
equilibrium will likely switch from negotiation to rec-
onciliatory negotiation to posted pricing as the cost of
negotiation increases or the supply-chain capacity
decreases.
We use the GNBS to model the outcome of the
negotiation. One limitation of this model is that it
ignores the presence of an announced price (e.g.,
sticker price), which puts a limit on the final transac-
tion price a customer pays. With an announced price,
the benefits from negotiation will be smaller, but we
expect that our results regarding the three types of
equilibrium continue to hold as well as the transition
of the equilibrium with respect to the negotiation cost
and supply-chain capacity.
Another limitation of GNBS is its implicit assump-
tion that the retailer’s and consumers’ valuations are
common knowledge. In the presence of information
asymmetry, there may be instances where the negoti-
ation breaks down even when a consumer values the
product more than the seller. GNBS does not capture
such situations. Nonetheless, GNBS appears to pro-
vide a good compromise between fidelity and tracta-
bility. The reasons for this assessment are twofold.
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First, while information asymmetry can lead to cases
where a deal breaks down, the transaction price that
arises under GNBS could still be a good proxy for the
equilibrium price that would arise whenever a deal is
struck under information asymmetry: For example,
Cramton (1992) considers a bargaining game where
parties make sequential offers after a strategically
chosen delay and constructs an equilibrium such that
the trade occurs at the price that would prevail if
there were no information asymmetry. Second, and
perhaps more importantly, the equilibrium outcomes
predicted by GNBS received considerable support
from behavioral research. If one wants to step away
from GNBS to look for alternative means that can cap-
ture information asymmetry, the remaining natural
choice would be a non-cooperative game-theoretic
model of bargaining. However, there is sufficient
experimental evidence to suggest that such non-coop-
erative solutions are no better than GNBS in predict-
ing the outcomes of actual bargaining situations (see
Chapter 4 in Kagel and Roth 1995 and Chapter 5 in
Davis and Holt 1992).
Our model assumes that no negotiation cost is
incurred in those cases where the customer’s reserva-
tion price is so low that the retailer and the customer
do not trade. This is in keeping with the Nash bar-
gaining solution, which posits that the parties would
never initiate negotiation if it is bound to fail. None-
theless, relaxing this assumption does not change our
insights at all. To examine this, we consider two mod-
ified versions of this model. In the first version of the
model, all customers negotiate with the retailer, no
matter what their reservation price is, and the retailer
incurs its cost of negotiation, cr, for all customers. In
the second version of the model, we assume that the
retailer negotiates only with customers whose reser-
vation price r exceeds their negotiation cost cb. Some
of these customers will still end up not purchasing
(those whose reservation price r falls below qmin), but
the retailer will incur the negotiation cost cr even for
those customers. Under both of these two models, our
analytical and numerical results suggest that our
insights regarding the equilibrium behavior continue
to hold.
Our model assumes that the supply chain commits
to one pricing policy for a given product. In some
cases, two pricing policies could coexist: selling at the
posted price to some customers while negotiating with
other customers. This hybrid pricing policy is more
pronounced when there are multiple types of custom-
ers differentiated by their bargaining power. The
supply chain’s pricing policy choice (posted pricing,
mixed, or negotiation) in the presence of the multi-seg-
mented consumer population merits further research.
We focused on a simple wholesale price contract in
this article. Although it is difficult to incorporate fur-
ther contract terms into our analysis, our results and
insights enable us to conjecture about how the equi-
librium might change as we change the contractual
terms. We note that the retailer prefers negotiation
when the wholesale price is low enough that the
retailer’s margin leaves enough room to price dis-
criminate among customers. Given this observation,
we expect that any contractual arrangement that low-
ers the retailer’s unit cost for the product will provide
the retailer further incentive to adopt negotiation.
Consequently, we expect that enriching the contrac-
tual arrangement to include quantity discounts or
channel rebates will increase the likelihood of negoti-
ation emerging in equilibrium. On the other hand, we
expect that any contractual change that increases the
retailer’s unit cost will induce the retailer to deploy
posted pricing.
There are certain strategic considerations that we
left out of our model. For example, some retailers
may opt for negotiation to accommodate bargain-
hunting customer segments that emerge in a tough
economic climate. Other retailers may opt for posted
pricing to carve a niche in a market primarily domi-
nated by retailers that haggle. Furthermore, if a manu-
facturer is selling through many dealers, the
manufacturer may try to enforce posted pricing to
maintain pricing consistency across its dealer net-
work. Our model does not explicitly consider the
effect of these factors on the choice between posted
pricing and negotiation. However, we show that,
even when none of these more strategic concerns is
present, supply-chain conflict may arise in the choice
of the pricing policy. How that conflict is further
shaped by the presence of strategic considerations
such as competition, bargain-hunting consumers, or
multiple sales channels is open to further research.
Notes
1Sources: http://www.trackerboats.com/about/no-hassle-
pricing.cfm, http://www.crystalpierz.com/no-haggle-no-
hassle.htm. Last retrieved: July 3, 2012.
2In particular, Equation (1) guarantees that the retailer’s
best responses are increasing and convex with respect to
the wholesale price under both pricing policies.
3When the supply-chain capacity Q is so large that pðQÞ
does not exist, we use the convention that pðQÞ ¼ 1.
4If Q is sufficiently large, it may not be possible for the
manufacturer to profitably induce the retailer to sell Q
units. In other words, there may not exist wPðQÞ [ c for
sufficiently large Q, in which case we follow the conven-
tion of setting wPðQÞ ¼ 1.
5We include the capacity Q in the list of arguments for the
functions PRN and PMN because the optimal values of
these functions will depend on Q. The dependence arises
because the retailer’s optimal cutoff valuation qmin must
be at least as large as the market-clearing price pðQÞ,
which is of course a function of the capacity Q.
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6There may not exist wNðQÞ [ c for sufficiently large Q,
in which case we follow the convention of setting
wNðQÞ ¼ 1.
7One could consider a variation of the discretionary
retailer model where the retailer’s pricing policy choice
precedes the manufacturer’s wholesale price decision. We
exclude this possibility, as it is not a very credible
sequence of events: The retailer would have little reason
to commit to a pricing policy before observing the whole-
sale price.
8Note that Proposition 4 includes two special cases: (i) The
retailer prefers posted pricing for all feasible wholesale
prices w  c and (ii) the retailer prefers negotiation for all
feasible wholesale prices w  c.
9This intuitive result is established by Lemma A.2(b) in
the Appendix, which states that quminðwÞ is increasing in w
and qminðw;QÞ ¼ maxfquminðwÞ; pðQÞg.
10In Figure 3, no matter what the equilibrium pricing
policy is, the sales quantity is bounded by the supply-
chain capacity. We should note, however, that at cT values
where negotiation is the equilibrium, if the manufacturer
switched to posted pricing, the sales quantity would be
lower than that obtained under negotiation. This is
because the manufacturer would have to charge a much
higher wholesale price to induce posted pricing, thereby
reducing the sales quantity below capacity.
11Sources: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lexus_LS#Sales_
and_production, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lexus_ SC#
Sales_and_production. Last retrieved: July 3, 2012.
12Source: http://money.cnn.com/2006/11/06/autos/pri-
us/—“Wait time for Prius buyers diminishing. Shortage of
popular gas-electric cars eases while demand cools, report
says.” Last retrieved: July 3, 2012.
13Source: http://www.carsdirect.com.
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